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Abstract 
Since the 1990s, India has significantly widened its relations with Africa. 
Three summits, increasing trade and newly agreed cooperation on security 
demonstrate the increased importance of the African continent to India’s 
foreign policy. 
With this commitment to Africa, India continually underscores its claim 
to act as advocate for the countries of the Global South. Moreover, African 
countries now account for a larger share of India’s energy imports, thereby 
reducing its dependence on Middle Eastern countries. India is also trying 
to establish a counterweight to China’s activities in Africa. However, India’s 
decision-makers realise that they cannot seriously compete with China in 
this arena. 
Germany and India share a number of similar economic and political 
interests. There is therefore great potential for closer cooperation in Africa 
and the Indian Ocean. The common goal is to strengthen state institutions 
in Africa, to promote economic development, and to prevent African states 
from becoming unilaterally dependent on third countries, especially China. 
This could potentially be translated into a number of programmes as part of 
triangular cooperation between India, Germany and African countries, such 
as capacity building, initial and further training, and the strengthening of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Particularly in the context of the stra-
tegic partnership between India and Germany, this could be an important 
step in taking bilateral relations to a new level. 
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Issues and Conclusions 
India’s Africa Policy 
Since gaining independence in 1947, the Indian 
Union has developed good relations with African 
states. Initially, the focus was on political issues such 
as support for decolonisation. Later, India advanced 
cooperation in international organisations within the 
framework of South-South cooperation, thus reinforc-
ing its claim to act as a representative of developing 
countries. Since 1991, when liberalisation began in 
India, economic and security issues have increasingly 
come to the fore. 
The African continent has gained greater impor-
tance for India since the 1990s. The most obvious 
evidence for this are the three India-Africa summits 
in 2008, 2011 and 2015. The most significant shift is 
that India has imported more energy from African 
countries and thus successfully diversified its energy 
imports. It has thus been able to reduce its depend-
ence on the Middle East. Africa is also relevant to 
India’s global ambitions. India continues to see itself 
as an advocate for the Global South and finds support 
for this role especially in Africa. The voting weight 
of African states plays an important part in a reform 
of the United Nations (UN) and India’s aspiration for 
a permanent seat on the Security Council. Moreover, 
the volume of trade between India and Africa has 
increased significantly since the 1990s. However, 
Africa’s share of India’s foreign trade is still rather 
small compared to that of Asia, Europe or the Middle 
East. Indian governments have tried to appeal to the 
Indian diaspora using various initiatives since the 
1990s and have also encouraged it to invest more in 
India – yet this is proving to be relatively difficult 
in the African context. With a few exceptions, African 
countries do not have very large Indian populations. 
Moreover, many members of this group, not least on 
the advice of former Indian governments, have now 
adopted the citizenship of their African home coun-
tries. 
In geopolitical terms, India’s Africa policy is of 
interest both in its relations with China and with Ger-
many and Europe. There is often talk of competition 
between India and China in Africa. Yet the foreign 
policy makers in New Delhi are well aware that they 
do not have the means and instruments to compete 
with China in Africa. Nevertheless, China does play a 
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role in India’s foreign policy towards Africa. Formats 
such as the summits with Africa are presumably 
based on comparable Chinese initiatives. Further-
more, in response to the Chinese Belt and Road Ini-
tiative (BRI), India has developed new foreign policy 
strategies, such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor 
(AAGC), which is to be implemented jointly with 
Japan. 
The shift in India’s foreign policy towards closer 
cooperation with partners in third countries also 
opens up new opportunities for cooperation with Ger-
many and the European Union (EU). This idea was 
first formulated in 2008, but was not followed up by 
India at the time. 
Regions such as Africa and the Indian Ocean, 
where Germany and India have a number of common 
interests, are ideal for such cooperation. First, both 
states are keen to secure sea routes in the Indian 
Ocean and to take action against piracy. From a Ger-
man perspective, this is also meant to combat the 
causes of forced displacement and to reduce migra-
tion flows. Second, Germany and India want to pre-
vent African states from becoming too politically and 
economically dependent on China due to increasing 
debt. 
Given their overlapping interests, Germany and 
India have great potential for future closer coopera-
tion in Africa or the Indian Ocean. The two states 
share a concern to establish and strengthen state in-
stitutions and promote economic development with-
in Africa. This could be translated into a number of 
programmes, such as capacity building, initial and 
further training, and the strengthening of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Especially in the context 
of their strategic partnership, this might be an impor-
tant step that could take bilateral relations between 
India and Germany to a new level. 
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India has significantly increased its engagement with 
African states since the 1990s. The most visible ex-
pression of this was the three India-Africa summits in 
2008, 2011 and 2015, and the noticeable increase 
in trade between the two parties. 
Africa has traditionally played 
an important role in Indian 
foreign policy. 
The African continent has traditionally played a 
major political role in Indian foreign policy. Indian 
governments have supported the anti-colonial libera-
tion movements in African countries and worked 
closely with them in the Non-Aligned Movement and 
the G77. Economically, however, the African con-
tinent was for a long time not particularly interesting 
for India, since the latter’s economic policy had a 
strong domestic focus. It was not until the liberalisa-
tion of India post-1991 that Africa became more im-
portant as an economic partner, especially in view of 
India’s growing demand for energy. 
Why should India’s Africa policy be of interest to 
German and European foreign policy? In 2000 India 
and Germany agreed on a strategic partnership; they 
have considerably expanded their political, economic, 
technological, cultural and military cooperation since 
then. Internationally, both states pursue shared inter-
ests, including reform of the United Nations, the 
maintenance of a rule-based international order, and 
the associated strengthening of multilateral institu-
tions. 
On the global level, the rise of China and the re-
sulting changes in the international order represent 
a significant challenge for Germany and India. Ger-
many had long considered China above all as one of 
its most important economic partners. But since 
China has begun taking over more and more Euro-
pean high-tech companies in the critical infrastruc-
ture sector, and has become increasingly involved in 
Central Eastern Europe, its economic activities under 
the aegis of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have 
been interpreted more critically, including by Ger-
many. India has traditionally been regarded as 
China’s rival, even though bilateral relations have 
improved markedly since the Doklam crisis of 2017.1 
But the Indian Union is one of the few states in Asia 
to refuse to participate in the BRI. 
As regards regional issues, India and Germany also 
have a number of common interests. First, the Indian 
Ocean is of great strategic importance to both. As a 
leading trading nation, Germany has an overriding 
interest in secure world trade, the main routes of 
which include the Indian Ocean. The threat to the sea 
lanes of communication posed by pirates, for instance 
off the Horn of Africa, or a race for geostrategic zones 
of influence in the region thus directly affect German 
and European interests. The same applies to India, 
which wants to increase its influence in the global 
economy. Furthermore, India is highly dependent on 
energy imports from the Middle East and Africa and 
thus also depends on safe shipping routes in the In-
dian Ocean. For several years, India has been pur-
suing a policy of security partnership with Indian 
Ocean island states so as to counter China’s growing 
involvement in the region. 
Second, there is an intersection between the stra-
tegic interests of German and Indian politics in parts 
of Africa. For German policymakers, Africa’s eco-
nomic development is also essential in terms of curb-
ing migration flows. This was emphasised by the Ger-
man G20 Presidency 2016/17 by its focus on Africa. By 
contrast, African states have some political relevance 
for India, mainly as partners in international organi-
sations. Although India’s economic relations with 
Africa have improved significantly, the African con-
 
1 In summer 2017, Indian and Chinese troops faced off 
for weeks in the border triangle between Bhutan, China and 
India. 
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tinent as a whole continues to play only a minor role. 
A common interest between Germany and India with 
regard to Africa might be to prevent excessive politi-
cal and economic dependence of African states on 
China, for example through growing indebtedness. 
Finally, for India and Germany the voting weight of 
the African states in the United Nations is significant 
for a possible reform of the Security Council. 
Proposals for closer cooperation between India and 
Germany were already made in 2008. They were re-
jected by India at the time, which evidently did not 
want to endanger its own initiatives and credibility 
by cooperating with former colonial powers. India 
was therefore considering cooperation with Brazil in 
Africa, rather than with the United Kingdom or Ger-
many.2 
Due to China’s growing influence in Africa, the 
continent has also become a stage for India to com-
pete for spheres of power and influence. However, 
India has considerably fewer foreign policy resources 
than China when it comes to pursuing its own inter-
ests. For this reason, the Indian government of Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi, in response to the Chinese 
Belt and Road Initiative, has since 2014 developed or 
revived several forms of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. India wants to counteract China’s grow-
ing influence in the Indo-Pacific, which also encom-
passes the Indian Ocean and East Africa. 
India’s increasing bilateral cooperation with the 
USA, Japan and Australia is part of this endeavour. 
The Quadrilateral Meeting (“Quad”) of the four states, 
which was renewed in 2017, sent a clear signal to 
China, although the future shape and direction of 
this institution remains unclear. In 2017, India and 
Japan agreed to create an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor 
(AAGC). The two governments are trying to push 
ahead with infrastructure projects in the countries 
bordering the Indian Ocean and in Africa so as to 
reduce Chinese influence. In 2018 India and France 
signed an agreement that will allow the Indian Navy 
to use French facilities in the Indian Ocean. The Euro-
pean Union – with its Asia Connectivity Policy and 
its new Strategy on India in autumn 2018 – also 
introduced new instruments aimed at closer coopera-
tion with India in third countries. 
 
2 See Sandeep Dikshit, “India to Shun Partnership with 
West in Africa”, The Hindu, 13 February 2008, https://www. 
the hindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/India-to-shun-
partner ship-with-West-in-Africa/article15164167.ece 
(accessed 13 February 2008). 
Considering this change in Indian foreign policy, 
which today more than ever seeks cooperation with 
Western states, new opportunities are opening up for 
joint Indo-German initiatives in third countries. The 
overall aim of this study is to identify the interests, 
goals and changes of India’s Africa policy over recent 
years. This analysis can then be translated into pre-
liminary measures for closer cooperation between 
Germany and India. The regional focus is on sub-
Saharan Africa. 
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Relations before 1991 
The African continent played an important role in 
Indian foreign policy from the outset. India was one 
of the first states to achieve independence after the 
end of the Second World War, in 1947. The work of 
Mahatma Gandhi – who had returned from South 
Africa to British India in 1914, where he had joined 
the Indian National Congress (INC) and fought peace-
fully against the British colonial power – served as 
an inspiration for the awakening of African national-
ism in the 1950s and 1960s.3 India’s Africa policy 
initially had two priorities:4 First, supporting anti-
colonial liberation movements and the fight against 
apartheid regimes in South Africa and Namibia;5 
second, the future relationship of ethnic Indian 
populations in Africa and the Indian Union. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Indian governments sup-
ported African liberation movements in various ways, 
including in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Commonwealth. In 1986, Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi succeeded in establishing an 
Africa Fund within the Non-Aligned Movement. India 
initially contributed 500 million rupees to the fund, 
which inter alia co-financed front states and libera-
tion movements in South Africa and Namibia.6 As 
part of its anti-apartheid policy, India also trained 
over 300 supporters of the African National Congress 
(ANC).7 
 
3 See Paul Musili Wambua, “India-Africa Security Coopera-
tion: Gains, Challenges and Future Prospects”, in India and 
Africa. Enhancing Mutual Engagement, ed. Ruchita Beri (New 
Delhi, 2014), 100–114 (101). 
4 See Ruchita Beri, “India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold 
War Era: An Assessment”, Strategic Analysis 27, no. 2 (April–
June 2003): 216–32 (217). 
5 See Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches, 
September 1946 – April 1961 (New Delhi, 1961), 543f. 
6 See Beri, “India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: 
An Assessment” (see note 4), 218. 
7 See Ruchita Beri, “India-Africa Security Engagement”, in 
India and Africa, ed. Beri (see note 3), 115–29 (121). 
After independence, the Indian government was 
faced with the question of how to deal with Indian 
populations in Africa. As far back as pre-colonial 
times, Indian traders had settled in East Africa amidst 
maritime trade in the Indian Ocean. During British 
colonial rule, more Indians had come to Africa and 
had, in some cases, assumed tasks in the colonial ad-
ministration. In Ethiopia this led to the concept of 
teacher becoming almost synonymous with that of 
“Indian”; in Mauritius the Indian population became 
the largest community.8 
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru argued 
that diaspora groups should integrate politically into 
their respective African societies and not claim spe-
cial economic rights over the local population.9 In 
some African countries, Indian populations also occu-
pied a prominent position in trade and the economy.10 
The Madhvanis and Mehtas families dominated parts 
of the economy in Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika, 
part of today’s Tanzania. Individual representatives of 
the Indian community were given important political 
offices in the new states. For example, Narendra Patel 
became the Speaker of Parliament in Uganda.11 
Following independence, a number of African 
states such as Kenya and Uganda opted for a policy 
of “Africanisation” vis-à-vis non-African groups. This 
also affected the Indian population in many coun-
tries. At the time, however, the Indian government 
supported Africanisation and therefore showed no 
willingness to act as an advocate for Indian ethnic 
groups abroad. When Kenyan President Jomo Ken-
 
8 See Sanjukta Banerji Bhattacharya, “The Role of the 
Indian Diaspora in Africa”, in India and Africa, ed. Beri 
(see note 3), 142–59 (153). 
9 See Beri, “India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: 
An Assessment” (see note 4), 217; Bhattacharya, “The Role 
of the Indian Diaspora in Africa” (see note 8), 149. 
10 See Bhattacharya, “The Role of the Indian Diaspora in 
Africa” (see note 8), 153; Phillip O. Nyinguro, “The Role of 
Indian Diaspora in Indo-African Co-operation”, in India and 
Africa, ed. Beri (see note 3), 130–41 (138). 
11 See Nyinguro, “The Role of Indian Diaspora in Indo-
African Co-operation” (see note 10), 137. 
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yatta, as part of his nationalisation policy, called on 
the Indian population to leave the country, only a 
few members were able to go to India, since most did 
not hold Indian citizenship. A low point for the 
Indian diaspora was the 1972 expulsion from Uganda 
under the Idi Amin regime.12 This fluctuating history 
of the Indian-born population in Africa, and the long 
neglect of their concerns by the Indian government, 
have led to the fact that large parts of the Indian-born 
population today feel more committed to their Afri-
can home states.13 
Based on the shared colonial experiences of India 
and Africa, the Indian government worked closely 
with African states in the newly created international 
institutions. From the outset, India saw itself as the 
representative and spokesman of these developing 
countries and promoted closer South-South coopera-
tion. It was supported by many African states in 
forums such as the G77 in the UN and in the Non-
Aligned Movement. From the beginning, India also 
cooperated closely with the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), founded in 1963.14 
Since the Indian Union pursued an economic 
policy of import substitution until 1991, economic 
issues initially played a very minor role in bilateral 
relations. An important foreign policy instrument, 
however, was South-South cooperation through the 
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) 
programme, which began in 1964 and included many 
representatives of African states. 
New Africa Policy since 1991 
The year 1991 marked a turning point in Indian 
politics. The balance of payments crisis at the time – 
triggered in part by the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
which was then India’s most important trading part-
ner – led to comprehensive economic policy reforms 
and a departure from the previous model of domestic, 
market-oriented development. Since then, all Indian 
governments have relied on foreign direct invest-
ment, technology transfer, export promotion, and 
stronger integration into the world market. 
 
12 See Bhattacharya, “The Role of the Indian Diaspora in 
Africa” (see note 8), 147, 150. 
13 Ibid., 148. 
14 See Wambua, “India-Africa Security Cooperation” 
(see note 3), 101. 
The associated liberalisation also had various 
effects on foreign policy with regard to Africa. As well 
as India’s new interest in expanding economic rela-
tions, other factors emerged: issues such as energy 
security and import diversification have now been 
given much more weight in India’s foreign policy; 
China’s growing engagement in Africa has intensified 
competition for resources and influence; and India 
reassessed its diaspora in the 1990s, correspondingly 
regarding it as a potential foreign policy instrument. 
This policy reversal also had consequences for Africa. 
In some areas, however, India’s interests in Africa 
remained constant. Its involvement there has under-
pinned its claim to international leadership as an 
advocate of the Global South, a claim it has repeatedly 
made since the 1970s. India is committed to reform-
ing the United Nations and is seeking a permanent 
seat on the Security Council. To facilitate such a 
reform, the weight of African states’ votes is key. In 
security matters, the fight against terrorism and piracy 
has also taken precedence in relations with Africa, in 
addition to the UN’s blue helmet missions.15 
 
 
15 See Beri, “India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: 
An Assessment” (see note 4), 216. 
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The India-Africa summits are the most visible sign 
of Africa’s increased importance in Indian foreign 
policy. They were partly a reaction by India to China’s 
increasing involvement in Africa.16 The Chinese gov-
ernment held its first meeting with African ministers 
in 2000 and since then has successively increased 
its political and economic involvement in the conti-
nent.17 In the face of competition for resources and 
spheres of influence, India has had to develop new 
formats for its future Africa policy. 
India reinforces its claim to 
continue to act as advocate for the 
Global South. 
The summits were supposed to take place every 
three years, alternately in India and Africa. The first 
was held in New Delhi in April 2008. The 14 African 
states whose representatives participated were 
selected by the African Union (AU). In the Africa-India 
Framework for Cooperation agreed at the summit, the 
two sides agreed on nine areas of cooperation. India 
approved US$5.4 billion in new credit lines and granted 
African Least Developed Countries (LDCs) tariff con-
cessions in order to boost trade.18 
The second meeting, this time with 15 African 
countries, took place in May 2011 in Addis Ababa. 
The Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Coopera-
tion adopted at the meeting extended bilateral co-
operation to other areas.19 India pledged US$5 billion 
in new loans and announced US$700 million to help 
 
16 See Ian Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa”, International 
Affairs 88, no. 4 (2012): 779–98 (784). 
17  See Denis M. Tull, Die Afrikapolitik der Volksrepublik China, 
SWP-Studie 20/2005 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik, August 2005). 
18 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 785. 
19 See Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), “Second Africa-
India Forum Summit 2011: Africa-India Framework for En-
hanced Cooperation”, mea.gov.in, 25 May 2011, http://mea. 
gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34/Second+AfricaIndia+ 
Forum+Summit+2011+AfricaIndia+Framework+for+Enhanced+
Cooperation (accessed 26 June 2018). 
build new institutions and put together education 
measures in Africa.20 Furthermore, the country 
awarded 400 new scholarships for African students 
and 500 additional training places in the ITEC pro-
gramme. The then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
declared that the number of African students in India 
would thereby increase to over 22,000.21 
The third summit meeting between India and the 
African states had to be postponed in 2014 because 
of the Ebola outbreak, and was held in New Delhi in 
October 2015.22 At the first two summits, the number 
of participants was limited to ten to 15 African Union 
countries. At the latest summit in 2015, there were no 
more restrictions. High-ranking representatives from 
over 40 African states took part, making it a great dip-
lomatic success for India.23 The Indian government 
also expanded the agenda. Whereas until then the 
main focus had been on issues such as loans and de-
velopment aid projects, in 2015 the Indian govern-
ment emphasised above all security policy issues and 
the desire to work together to combat terrorism.24 
These improved political relations are also reflected 
in the shuttle diplomacy of high-ranking Indian poli-
 
20 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 786; 
M. Ganapathi, “India-Africa Partnership”, in India and Africa, 
ed. Beri (see note 3), 1–4 (3). 
21 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 788. 
22 See “India-Africa Forum Summit Kicks off in New 
Delhi”, The Hindu, 26 October 2015, http://www.thehindu. 
com/news/national/indiaafrica-forum-summit-kicks-off-in-
new-delhi/article7805377.ece (accessed 26 October 2015). 
23 See Syed A. A. Farhan, “India-Africa Forum Summit: 
A Precursor for Paris”, The Diplomat, 28 October 2015, https:// 
thediplomat.com/2015/10/india-africa-forum-summit-a-
precursor-for-paris/ (accessed 26 February 2018). 
24 See Shubhajit Roy, “India-Africa Summit: 12 African 
Leaders Talk Terror, Defence with PM Narendra Modi”, The 
Indian Express, 25 December 2015, http://indianexpress.com/ 
article/india/india-news-india/india-africa-summit-pm-
narendra-modi-holds-bilateral-talks-with-african-leaders/ 
(accessed 26 February 2018). 
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ticians.25 Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took 
office in 2014, each African country has been visited 
by at least one Indian minister.26 The Prime Minister 
himself has visited several African countries, most 
recently for the summit of the BRICS states (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, South Africa), held in South 
Africa in the summer of 2018.27 
Finally, the Indian government also plans to ex-
pand its political presence in Africa. At the beginning 
of 2018, India had 29 embassies in African countries. 
To do justice to the growing importance of the con-
tinent, it plans to open 18 new embassies by 2021, 
which would mean an increase of over 60 per cent. 
These are not only to extend economic relations, but 
also to further strengthen links with the diaspora.28 
 
25 See Elizabeth Roche, “Narendra Modi’s Africa Visit: Key 
Takeaways”, Live Mint, 11 July 2016, http://www.livemint. 
com/Politics/jAM83lK6PAhxVE9t6o1ISI/Narendra-Modis-
Africa-trip-key-takeaways.html (accessed 11 July 2016). 
26 See Vikas Dhoot, “Africa Our Top Priority in Foreign, 
Economic Policy Matters: Modi”, The Hindu, 23 May 2017, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/narendra-modi-
inaugurates-african-development-banks-agm/article1852 
8915.ece (accessed 23 May 2017). 
27 See “Modi Leaves for Home after Concluding Three-
nation Africa Tour”, The Hindu, 27 July 2018, https://www. 
thehindu.com/news/national/prime-minister-narendra-modis-
three-nation-africa-tour/article24533920.ece (accessed 27 July 
2018). 
28 See “India to Open 18 New Embassies in Africa by 
2021”, africanews.com, 3 April 2018, http://www.africanews. 
com/2018/04/03/india-to-open-18-new-embassies-in-africa-by-
2021/ (accessed 14 August 2018). 
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The Indian diaspora consists of two different groups 
of people, so-called Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and 
Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs). The NRIs are Indian 
citizens who have emigrated. The PIOs, on the other 
hand, have Indian ancestors, but have assumed the 
citizenship of their new home country and are there-
fore not Indian citizens. 
The total size of the Indian diaspora is estimated 
at between 25 and 30 million people globally. Eleven 
states have at least one million each, and a further 22 
states have at least 1,000 each.29 Africa accounts for 
around 8 per cent of the total Indian diaspora. The 
largest groups are in South Africa (about 1.5 million), 
Mauritius (855,000), Réunion (220,000), Kenya 
(100,000), Tanzania (100,000) and Uganda (90,000).30 
Particularly in the island states of the Indian 
Ocean, the diaspora accounts for a large proportion of 
the total population. In Mauritius, the proportion of 
the population of Indian origin is over 60 per cent, in 
Réunion 31 per cent and in the Seychelles around 6 
per cent. In the territorial states, on the other hand, 
the highest share is only 2.5 per cent (South Africa); 
the share is much lower in Botswana (0.66 per cent), 
Kenya (0.3) and Tanzania (0.28), for example.31 In 
contrast to the Indian diaspora in the USA, the frag-
mentation and very small population numbers in 
African states make it difficult for the Indian govern-
ment to address Indian ethnic groups.32 
In the 1950s, Nehru still advocated the integration 
of the Indian diaspora into their respective states; 
in the 1990s the role of the diaspora within Indian 
foreign policy was fundamentally reassessed. One of 
the reasons for this was China’s positive experience. 
Chinese ethnic groups abroad made a significant con-
tribution to China’s economic upswing by their in-
 
29 See Nyinguro, “The Role of Indian Diaspora in Indo-
African Co-operation” (see note 10), 133. 
30 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 781. 
31 See Nyinguro, “The Role of Indian Diaspora in Indo-
African Co-operation” (see note 10), 135. 
32 See Bhattacharya, “The Role of the Indian Diaspora in 
Africa” (see note 8), 151. 
vestments in their home country. The Indian gov-
ernment set up a new department in the mid-1990s 
to better support various groups of Indian people 
abroad. The focus was on the Indian community in 
the USA, which has been economically very success-
ful. It is largely thanks to its political commitment 
that bilateral relations between the two largest de-
mocracies have improved. Furthermore, the diaspora 
is seen as part of India’s soft power in partner coun-
tries, helping to enhance India’s image.33 
When the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took office 
in 1999, it intensified its efforts towards the diaspora. 
In September 2000, the government set up a high-
level commission to make new proposals that would 
encourage relations with the diaspora. The Commis-
sion’s report, published in January 2002, inter alia 
proposed the possibility of dual citizenship for NRIs 
and PIOs resident mainly in Western industrialised 
countries.34 
Since taking office in 2014, Prime Minister Modi 
has been intensively involved with the diaspora 
during his trips abroad. As part of his first visit to 
America in September of the same year, he gave 
a speech aimed at the Indian diaspora at Madison 
Square Garden in New York. Modi made similar ap-
pearances during his travels to Great Britain and 
Australia. On a visit to Uganda in the summer of 
2018, Modi also addressed the Indian community in 
the country.35 
The relatively small size of groups of Indian origin, 
the lack of Indian government support for them, and 
the success of their integration into African states 
explain why this new foreign policy initiative initially 
met with little interest in Africa. The high fees in-
volved meant that the newly introduced ID card for 
 
33 Ibid., 152f. 
34 See Beri, “India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: 
An Assessment” (see note 4), 225. 
35 See MEA, “Re-Energising India’s Engagement with 
Africa”, mea.gov.in, 2 August 2018, https://www.mea.gov. 
in/in-focus-article.htm?30210/Reenergising+Indias+ 
Engagement+With+Africa (accessed 14 August 2018). 
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PIOs had little initial approval.36 Furthermore, a study 
conducted in 2006 showed that significantly more 
people of Indian descent had taken on the citizenship 
of their new home country than, for example, the 
Chinese had.37 In 2006 the Indian government intro-
duced the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) pro-
gramme, which facilitated a limited form of dual 
citizenship for NRIs and PIOs.38 
 
36 See Beri, “India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: 
An Assessment” (see note 4), 225. 
37 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 782. 
38 See Bhattacharya, “The Role of the Indian Diaspora in 
Africa” (see note 8), 152f. 
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In contrast to Western industrial nations, which 
separate their economic and development coopera-
tion, the two areas are closely interlinked in India. 
Officially, India does not engage in development 
cooperation (DC), but South-South cooperation. This 
term is deliberately intended to set India apart from 
Western development cooperation.39 As well as tra-
ditional bilateral trade, South-South cooperation 
comprises various instruments and serves capacity 
building, lending, and both export and economic 
promotion for Indian companies.40 Normative con-
siderations, such as the issue of democracy, have no 
role here. India supports many African countries 
technically and administratively to build democratic 
systems. This does not, however, correspond to West-
ern policies of democracy promotion. 
Trade and Energy 
As early as 2002, India’s state-owned Export-Import 
Bank (EXIM) launched the Focus Africa Programme to 
expand economic relations with selected states in the 
region. The initial focus was on Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Mauritius. In due course Nigeria, South Africa, Ethio-
pia, Tanzania and Ghana were also added. Lending 
to these countries has been expanded to support their 
imports of goods and services from India. Further-
more, Indian companies wanting to export to these 
countries received a special status and stronger sup-
 
39 The scientific literature, however, refers to development 
cooperation in the case of India as well: see Sachin Chatur-
vedi, Emerging Patterns in Architecture for Management of Economic 
Assistance and Development Cooperation: Implications and Chal-
lenges for India, Development Economics Working Papers 
22092 (New Delhi: East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, 
2008). 
40 See Sachin Chaturvedi, “Trade and Investments in India 
and Africa Relations: Trends and Prospects”, in India and 
Africa, ed. Beri (see note 3), 92–99 (92). 
port from the respective Indian embassies on the 
ground.41 
In 2004 India, together with eight West African 
states,42 launched the so-called TEAM-9 initiative 
(Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Move-
ment), which also aimed to expand economic rela-
tions. Equatorial Guinea was of particular importance 
at that time. With this initiative, India wanted to par-
ticipate in the development of oil reserves in the Gulf 
of Guinea.43 During the first summit in 2008, India 
implemented a series of tariff reductions for African 
Least Developed Countries. 
These various initiatives have contributed to a 
significant expansion of trade. The volume of trade 
between India and African countries grew from 
US$5.3 billion in 2001 to 12 billion in 2005 and 70 
billion in 2013. At the World Economic Forum in 
Delhi in 2014, the two sides reaffirmed their inten-
tion to reach a trade volume of US$500 billion by 
2020. As well as expanding trade, the Indian govern-
ment supports private investors and aims to diversify 
trade. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), for 
example, has organised nine India-Africa meetings 
for its member companies.44 
However, trade has been declining in recent years. 
The trade volume fell from US$71.5 billion in the 
2014/15 financial year to 56.7 billion in 2015/16, and 
 
41 See Beri, “India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: 
An Assessment” (see note 4), 222; see Taylor, “India’s Rise in 
Africa” (see note 16), 780. 
42 Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Senegal. 
43 See C. Raja Mohan, “India, China and the ‘London 
Club’”, The Hindu, 1 March 2004, https://www.thehindu.com/ 
2004/03/01/stories/2004030105611100.htm (accessed 1 March 
2004). 
44 See Shruti Gakhar and Subir Gokarn, “India-Africa 
Trade and Investment Patterns: A Backdrop”, in India and 
Africa. Forging a Strategic Partnership, ed. Subir Gokarn, W. P. S. 
Sidhu and Shruti Godbole (New Delhi: Brookings India, Octo-
ber 2015), 44–48 (45), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/10/india-africa-briefing-book-brookings-india.pdf 
(accessed 28 January 2019). 
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finally to just under 52 billion in 2016/17. In addition, 
the trade balance is now in Africa’s favour. While 
India still managed a trade surplus of US$2.1 billion 
in the 2005/06 financial year, this turned into a defi-
cit of US$6.6 billion in 2015/16. The main reason for 
this was the price rise in oil and raw materials.45 
Furthermore, India’s trade is currently concentrated 
on only a few states and products. The six African 
states of Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Morocco 
and Algeria are responsible for 89 per cent of exports 
to India. The product focus is on energy and raw 
materials such as oil, gas, ores and gold.46 Oil and gas 
exports alone now account for two thirds of African 
exports to India. With a share of around 24 per cent, 
the African continent has become an important 
energy supplier for India.47 In 2005, there had hardly 
been any energy supplies from Africa. 
India imports more energy from 
Africa and is now less dependent on 
the Middle East. 
The new importance of energy exports has also 
changed African countries’ significance for trade. In 
2001, Southern Africa still accounted for around 60 
perc ent of exports to India, compared with only 16 
per cent from West Africa. By 2011, the picture had 
changed. In that year, about 40 per cent of exports to 
India came from West Africa, while Southern Africa’s 
share had fallen to 24 per cent. East African states, 
with their traditionally high proportion of Indian-
born inhabitants, are the most important market for 
Indian products, but accounted for only two per cent 
of African exports to India in 2011.48 West Africa 
 
45 See Abhishek Mishra, The African Continental Free Trade 
Area and Its Implications for India-Africa Trade, ORF Occasional 
Paper 171 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation [ORF], 
October 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-
african-continental-free-trade-area-and-its-implications-for-
india-africa-trade/ (accessed 14 January 2019). 
46 See Preeti Sinha, “India’s Emerging Role in Africa’s 
Sustainable Development”, in India and Africa, ed. Gokarn, 
Sidhu and Godbole (see note 44), 32–34 (32). 
47 Beri, “India-Africa Security Engagement” (see note 7), 
120. 
48 See Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and World 
Trade Organization (WTO), India-Africa: South-South. Trade and 
Investment for Development (Geneva and New Delhi, 2013), 16, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/global_ 
review13prog_e/india_africa_report.pdf (accessed 28 January 
2019). 
gained its new importance primarily through oil and 
energy imports, especially from Nigeria and states on 
the Gulf of Guinea. 
South Africa is India’s most important trading 
partner, accounting for over 22 per cent of India’s 
exports. Tanzania has shown the greatest growth in 
recent years and now accounts for over 9 per cent of 
India’s exports to the whole of Africa. Indian exports 
are mainly refined petroleum products, cars and car 
parts, pharmaceuticals, and electrical and industrial 
machinery. There are regional differences. India ex-
ports mainly petroleum products to East and South-
ern Africa, pharmaceuticals to West and Central Af-
rica, and vehicles and vehicle parts to North Africa.49 
African countries are interesting for India not only 
as suppliers of oil and gas, but also of uranium. Since 
India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), relations with states such as Niger and Na-
mibia, which are not members of the Nuclear Sup-
pliers Group (NSG), are of great strategic interest to 
India.50 
Alongside its bilateral relations, India cooperates 
with a number of regional organisations in Africa. 
Since 2006 there has been cooperation between the 
Indian state and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).51 The Indian EXIM Bank also 
supports the Common Market for Eastern and South-
ern Africa (COMESA) through loans and credits to 
encourage the participating states to buy more Indian 
goods and products.52 African institutions also reward 
development cooperation with India. In 2017, the 
African Development Bank held its annual meeting 
in the Indian state of Gujarat, which had previously 
been governed by Prime Minister Modi.53 
India also works in regional organisations such as 
the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) with island 
states and East African rim states. The organisation 
was founded in 1997 by India, South Africa, Australia 
and Singapore. India played a major role in the reori-
entation of the IORA in 2013. Since then, maritime 
 
49 Ibid., 38. 
50 Ramesh Ramachandran, “India to Tap Uranium-rich 
Africa for Fuel”, The Asian Age, 5 February 2008. 
51 See Wambua, “India-Africa Security Cooperation” 
(see note 3), 106. 
52 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 787. 
53 See “Continental Ties – India’s Outreach to Africa”, 
The Hindu, 24 May 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/ 
editorial/continental-ties/article18551784.ece (accessed 24 
May 2017). 
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security issues have received greater attention in its 
work.54 
The International Solar Alliance (ISA) initiated 
by India at the 2015 Africa Summit focuses on the 
expansion and increased use of solar energy. In recent 
years, India has been able to win over several more 
African countries for the ISA.55 Finally, special rela-
tions still exist with states such as South Africa: in 
the BRICS format and the India-Brazil-South Africa 
Dialogue Forum (IBSA), both advocate reorganising 
the international system.56 
South-South Cooperation 
Despite its economic successes and high growth rates 
since 1991, India is still one of the largest recipients 
of official development assistance from both multi-
lateral organizations and bilateral donors. In early 
2018, the total volume of German development co-
operation with India was 8.5 billion euros.57 However, 
as early as 1964 India itself started to finance develop-
ment measures in other countries through its ITEC 
programme. ITEC has become one of the most impor-
tant foreign policy instruments for developing South-
South cooperation, including relations with Africa. 
India has pursued development 
measures in Africa for decades, thus 
increasing its influence there. 
When attributing its development programmes, 
India is not guided by the criteria of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), in which 
most donor countries have committed themselves to 
uniform standards. India follows the DAC criteria as 
a recipient country, but not as a donor country.58 This 
 
54 See Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, “Rise in Piracy: Case Study 
Somalia”, in India and Africa, ed. Beri (see note 3), 63–76 (71). 
55 See “Continental Ties – India’s Outreach to Africa” 
(see note 53). 
56 See Arvind Gupta, “India Africa Relations in the Chang-
ing Geopolitical Environment”, in India and Africa, ed. Beri 
(see note 3), 21–24 (23). 
57 See German Foreign Office, “Deutschland und Indien: 
bilaterale Beziehungen”, Berlin, 26 March 2019, https:// 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/indien-
node/-/205980#content_3 (accessed 28 January 2019). 
58 See Chaturvedi, Emerging Patterns in Architecture for 
Management of Economic Assistance and Development Cooperation 
(see note 39), 36. 
would involve a number of commitments in other 
policy areas that Indian governments reject as in-
admissible interference in their internal affairs. 
The first priority of India’s development coopera-
tion is education and training in areas such as finance 
and accounting, information technology, promotion 
of small and medium-sized enterprises, languages, 
rural development, the environment and renewable 
energies.59 These programmes are aimed primarily at 
senior civil servants, scientists, politicians and mili-
tary personnel from countries of the Global South, 
but are overwhelmingly held at institutions in India. 
From India’s perspective, these measures are intended 
to share its own experiences and thus strengthen 
South-South cooperation.60 In addition to ITEC, there 
are similar measures in the Special Commonwealth 
Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP) and the 
Technical Cooperation Scheme (TCS) of the 1951 
Colombo Plan. ITEC also sends Indian experts (includ-
ing military advisors) abroad, prepares project studies, 
conducts study trips, and provides funds for disaster 
relief.61 Furthermore, the Indian Council for Cultural 
Relations (ICCR) offers 3,365 scholarships annually 
for a total of 24 programmes, of which approximately 
900 are earmarked for Africa.62 
These programmes have probably helped to 
strengthen India’s position as the advocate for devel-
oping countries over the years. By 2006/07, 40,000 
people had completed events as part of the pro-
grammes.63 In 2013/14, applicants from 161 countries 
were offered a total of 8,000 places in 280 courses 
at 47 educational institutions in India.64 This means 
that, to date, well over 50,000 people from politics, 
business and administration in developing countries 
have probably been to India for education and train-
 
59 See Government of India, MEA, ITEC. Civilian Training 
Programme 2011–2012 (New Delhi, n.D.) 
60 See Nina Khan, “‘Wir nennen uns nicht gerne Geber’ – 
Der staatliche Entwicklungsdiskurs des Neuen Gebers Indien”, 
Asien 138 (January 2016): 9–30 (22f.). 
61 Chaturvedi, Emerging Patterns in Architecture for Manage-
ment of Economic Assistance and Development Cooperation (see 
note 39), 33. 
62 See Sachin Chaturvedi, “Exploring Multiple Facets of 
India-Africa Development Cooperation”, in India and Africa, 
ed. Gokarn, Sidhu and Godbole (see note 44), 35–37 (37). 
63 See Subhash Agrawal, Emerging Donors in International 
Development Assistance: The India Case (Ottawa: International 
Development Research Centre, 2007), 9. 
64 See Government of India, MEA, Annual Report 2013–14 
(New Delhi, 2014), 127. 
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ing purposes. The Indian government boasts, for ex-
ample, that so far 13 incumbent or former presidents, 
prime ministers and vice-presidents from African 
states have taken part in training programmes in 
India. Moreover, there are six current or former army 
chiefs who were trained at institutions in India.65 
The ITEC programme is managed by the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) so that the allo-
cation of training places and scholarships can be 
adapted relatively quickly to changing foreign policy 
objectives. 
However, the regional distribution shows that 
Africa still does not play a major role in overall 
resource allocation. The ITEC programme continues 
to focus on India’s South Asian neighbours. In 2013/ 
14, more than 80 per cent of all development funds 
went to neighbouring countries, mainly Bhutan (48.8 
per cent), Bangladesh (10.7 per cent) and Afghanistan 
(9.7 per cent). In contrast, all African countries to-
gether received only 4.6 per cent.66 
The second pillar of development cooperation is 
loans and subsidies to developing countries by the 
state-owned Export-Import Bank. In recent years, 
India has continuously expanded its financial com-
mitment to South-South cooperation and in 2014/15 
recorded a total of 194 credit lines for 63 countries 
amounting to US$11.7 billion.67 
The bulk of the financial support, US$6.6 billion, 
went to African countries.68 Between 2006 and 2015, 
African countries accounted for around 58 per cent 
of all loans and credits.69 The money is mainly used 
to expand economic relations with India, and for the 
activities of Indian companies in Africa. For example, 
the Focus Africa programme included credit lines to 
facilitate the export of Indian goods to the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The 
loans are thus not so much development funds, but 
rather economic development funds for private and 
state-owned Indian enterprises.70 
 
65 See Dhoot, “Africa Our Top Priority in Foreign, Economic 
Policy Matters: Modi” (see note 26). 
66 See Government of India, MEA, Annual Report 2013–14 
(see note 64), 207. 
67 See EXIM Bank India, Annual Report 2014/15 (Mumbai, 
2015), 21. 
68 See Government of India, MEA, Annual Report 2013–14 
(see note 64), 124. 
69 See Chaturvedi, “Exploring Multiple Facets of India-
Africa Development Cooperation” (see note 62), 37. 
70 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 787. 
The most important sectors for Indian companies 
in this context are agriculture, pharmaceuticals, in-
formation technology, finance, textiles, energy and 
the automotive sector.71 All major international 
Indian companies – such as ArcelorMittal, Vedanta 
Resources, the Tata Group and Airtel – are repre-
sented in Africa. 
India is also active in a number of ways in Africa’s 
infrastructure development. India first established a 
technical college in Nairobi in 1956. Indian compa-
nies laid a pipeline from Khartoum to Port Sudan in 
2009; Indian companies such as Airtel have attractive 
offers for many African countries for electronic pay-
ment systems in rural areas.72 Inter alia, the Tata 
Group operates a coffee-processing factory in Uganda 
and a vehicle plant in Zambia, thus helping those 
states to diversify their exports.73 Indian pharmaceu-
tical companies such as Ranbaxy have expanded their 
production in Africa. Due to World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO) exemptions, they are able to produce in-
expensive medicines to fight HIV/AIDS. These inex-
pensive Indian medicines have significantly increased 
the proportion of AIDS patients undergoing treat-
ment, for example in Nigeria.74 
India has supported the establishment of pan-
African institutions with many projects. Showcase 
projects include the Pan African E-Network Project 
with three universities in Ghana, Cameroon and 
Uganda and a telemedicine centre in Tanzania.75 
Other examples are the India-Africa Institute of For-
eign Trade, the India-Africa Institute of Agriculture 
and Rural Development, the India-Africa Civil Avia-
tion Academy, the India-Africa Institute of Education, 
Planning and Administration, and the India-Africa 
Institute of Information Technology.76 
India is also supporting a number of African coun-
tries such as Ethiopia in computerising their customs 
systems in order to improve trade processing.77 India 
 
71 Ibid., 780. 
72 On these examples, see Gakhar and Gokarn, “India-
Africa Trade and Investment: A Backdrop” (see note 44), 46f.; 
Sunil Bharti Mittal, “Telecom Investments into Africa”, in 
India and Africa, ed. Gokarn, Sidhu and Godbole (see note 44), 
73–75 (74). 
73 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 790. 
74 Ibid., 791. 
75 See Sinha, “India’s Emerging Role in Africa’s Sustain-
able Development” (see note 46), 33. 
76 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 786f. 
77 See Chaturvedi, “Trade and Investments in India and 
Africa Relations: Trends and Prospects” (see note 40), 94. 
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is participating with its loan of US$300 million in 
the new railway line between Ethiopia and Djibouti.78 
Another focus of cooperation with African countries 
is on low-cost housing programmes, which are being 
operated jointly with Zambia, Kenya, Togo and Mau-
ritania, among others.79 
Official announcements cast development coopera-
tion in a positive light, but there are also negative as-
pects. The African market sets high hurdles for Indian 
companies, for example. Company representatives 
complain about a lack of information about respec-
tive national markets in Africa, different standards, 
and deficits in infrastructure.80 Other criticisms in-
clude high transport costs, a poor business climate, 
widespread corruption and difficult access to fi-
nance.81 Indian companies are considered vulnerable 
to bribery, probably due to the high level of corrup-
tion in their own country.82 Indian companies are 
also accused of land grabs, for example in Ethiopia. 
Land acquisition in Africa is particularly interesting 
for major investors, as land prices are often lower 
than in India. For example, Indian food companies 
can acquire much larger areas of land than in India 
and outsource their production for the Indian market 
to third countries at low cost.83 In this context, parts 
of the local population` were expelled repeatedly.84 
 
78 See Ganapathi, “India-Africa Partnership” (see note 20), 3. 
79 See Chaturvedi, “Trade and Investments in India and 
Africa Relations: Trends and Prospects” (see note 40), 95. 
80 Pranav Kumar, “India-Africa Economic Relations in the 
Emerging Economic Order. A Perspective from the Indian 
Private Sector”, in Securing the 21st Century. Mapping India-
Africa Engagement, ed. Ritika Passi and Ihssane Guennoun 
(New Delhi, 2018), 114–24 (121). 
81 See Gakhar and Gokarn, “India-Africa Trade and Invest-
ment: A Backdrop” (see note 44), 45. 
82 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 791; 
Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson, Ascending India 
and Its State Capacity. Extraction, Violence, and Legitimacy (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), 219ff. 
83 See “Land Grab in Africa, Brought to You by India”, 
goimonitor.com, 13 December 2011, https://www.goimonitor. 
com/story/land-grab-africa-brought-you-india (accessed 
8 August 2018); “Land Grab by MNCs in Africa Cause for 
Concern: Experts”, The Hindu, 19 December 2012, https:// 
www.thehindu.com/news/international/Land-grab-by-MNCs-
in-Africa-cause-for-concern-Experts/article12464933.ece 
(accessed 19 December 2012). 
84 See Ashish Kothari, “How Ethiopians Are Being Pushed 
off Their Land”, The Hindu, 19 February 2013, https://www. 
thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/how-ethiopians-are-being-
pushed-off-their-land/article4428760.ece (accessed 19 Febru-
When the Canadian oil company Talisman had to sell 
two oil fields in Sudan due to pressure from human 
rights organisations, they were acquired by the Indian 
state oil company ONGC Videsh Limited.85 
Against this background, it was suggested that 
Indian companies should strengthen their commit-
ment to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) prin-
ciples, so as to contribute to improving the business 
climate and their reputation among Africans.86 
The Indian state’s development projects and pri-
vate companies in Africa also frequently suffer from 
poor implementation. This concerns both their speed 
and scope. Indian companies seem to have great – 
and oft-lamented – difficulties in effectively imple-
menting their projects in Africa.87 
Cultural exchanges, for instance through scholar-
ships and the growing number of African students 
in India, also often lead to problems. There are huge 
prejudices against African students amongst the 
Indian population,88 and there have been several 
violent attacks. After the killing of a Congolese stu-
dent in New Delhi in early summer 2016, African 
ambassadors advised their governments not to send 
any more students to India for the time being.89 In 
response to the incident, Indian facilities in Kinshasa 
were even attacked.90 After a series of assaults on 
 
ary 2013); Metasebia Tadesse, “How Ethiopians Benefit from 
Indian (and Other) Land Investors”, The Hindu, 27 February 
2013, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/How-
Ethiopians-benefit-from-Indian-and-other-land-investors/ 
article12363239.ece (accessed 27 February 2013). 
85 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 792. 
86 See Indian Council of World Affairs, India-Africa in the 
21st Century – A Comprehensive Partnership (New Delhi, 23 Janu-
ary 2015), 4. 
87 See Rani D Mullen, “Refocusing on Africa. Slow Delivery 
of Aid, Low Credit Disbursement Can Undo India’s Strategy”, 
The Indian Express, 13 August 2018, https://indianexpress.com/ 
article/opinion/columns/refocusing-on-africa-india-relations-
strategy-modi-government-5303410/ (accessed 13 August 
2018). 
88 See Shubhomoy Sikdar, “‘They Ask Me If I Am a Canni-
bal’”, The Hindu, 29 March 2017, https://www.thehindu.com/ 
news/cities/Delhi/they-ask-if-i-am-a-cannibal/article17726134. 
ece (accessed 30 March 2017). 
89 See Kallol Bhattacherjee, “Death of Congolese Student: 
Government Seeks to Cool African Ire”, The Hindu, 25 May 
2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/committed-to-
safety-and-security-of-african-nationals-in-india-says-sushma/ 
article8644907.ece (accessed 25 May 2016). 
90 See Kallol Bhattacherjee, “Reprisals in Congo; India 
Plans Outreach”, The Hindu, 27 May 2016, http://www. 
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African citizens in India, African ambassadors even 
issued a joint declaration in Delhi in early April 2017 
threatening to refer the matter to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council.91 
Foreign Investments 
In the period from 2002 to 2012, around US$64 
billion in investments flowed from Africa to India. 
Surprisingly, a small African country is the world’s 
largest direct investor in India: Mauritius.92 99.5 per 
cent of all African investments in India were made 
from there.93 The next largest investors during this 
period were Morocco and South Africa.94 
However, this peculiarity is not due to the economic 
power of the island state with its large Indian section 
of the population, but rather to its advantageous tax 
legislation. To save taxes, foreign companies – as 
well as Indian companies whose owners are Indians 
abroad (Non-Resident Indians) – use Mauritius as a 
starting point for their investments in India. This is 
why the island state has now replaced Singapore as 
the most attractive place for Indian foreign invest-
ment. Indian companies invest in Africa via Mauri-
tius. In official statistics, these funds are then listed as 
direct investments from Mauritius. The small country 
therefore plays a similar role for India as Hong Kong 
does for China.95 
 
thehindu.com/news/national/congolese-student-killing-india-
plans-outreach-amid-reprisals-in-congo/article8651748.ece 
(accessed 27 May 2016). 
91 See Kallol Bhattacherjee, “African Envoys Seek U.N. 
Probe into Noida Attacks”, The Hindu, 3 April 2017, http:// 
www.thehindu.com/news/national/hrc-should-investigate-
anti-african-attacks-african-envoys/article17768164.ece 
(accessed 3 April 2017); Jael Silliman, “It’s Time for Africa”, 
The Hindu, 31 March 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/ 
opinion/lead/its-time-for-africa-cultural-engagement-with-
the-continent-is-necessary-to-combat-racism/article17745471. 
ece (accessed 31 March 2017). 
92 See “Mauritius Largest Source of FDI in India, Says 
RBI”, The Hindu Business Line, 19 January 2018, https://www. 
thehindubusinessline.com/money-and-banking/mauritius-
largest-source-of-fdi-in-india-says-rbi/article10042149.ece 
(accessed 28 January 2019). 
93 See CII/WTO, India-Africa: South-South. Trade and Investment 
for Development (see note 48), 33; author’s own calculations. 
94 Ibid., 34. 
95 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 789f. 
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In the security sector, India has three major issues in 
its relations with Africa: first, its extensive involve-
ment in UN blue helmet missions in African conflicts; 
second, the fight against terrorism and maritime secu-
rity issues; third, military cooperation, particularly in 
training. In recent years India has also made greater 
efforts to cooperate on arms policy with individual 
African states. Here, the Indian Ocean has a special 
role to play. On the one hand, India focuses on the 
fight against piracy, especially in the Horn of Africa; 
on the other hand, it pursues its rivalry with China, 
whose expansion in the Indian Ocean it monitors 
warily. 
For many years, India has been one of the largest 
providers of troops for UN blue helmet missions. 
Indian armed forces were already involved in the 
UN’s first military operation in Congo in the early 
1960s. To date, some 8,000 Indian soldiers and mili-
tary observers have been stationed in various UN 
missions in Africa. In 2014/15, 80 per cent of Indian 
blue helmets were deployed on the continent. At the 
same time, Africa accounts for 70 per cent of the 
losses among India’s blue helmets. India has also sent 
police forces, including female personnel, to Africa 
on peacekeeping missions.96 The country has repeat-
edly supported African Union peace initiatives.97 At 
the second India-Africa summit in 2011, the Indian 
government pledged US$2 million for the AU mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM).98 
The Indian Ocean is the main artery of the Indian 
economy. This is why the Indian Navy has been en-
gaged in anti-piracy operations since 2008. India is 
a member of the International Contact Group on 
Somalia and has worked with states in East and 
southern Africa, including monitoring their Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) and anti-piracy patrols. From 
 
96 See Anit Mukherjee, “At the Crossroads: India and the 
Future of UN Peacekeeping in Africa”, in India and Africa, 
ed. Gokarn, Sidhu and Godbole (see note 44), 38–40 (38). 
97 See Wambua, “India-Africa Security Cooperation” 
(see note 3), 107. 
98 See Ganapathi, “India-Africa Partnership” (see note 20), 4. 
2008 to 2013, Indian Navy patrols escorted 114 Indian 
ships and 1,037 ships flying other flags in the Gulf of 
Aden, and fended off 13 pirate attacks.99 In December 
2018, the Indian Navy escorted a World Food Pro-
gramme ship for the first time, in cooperation with 
Operation Atalanta of the European Union.100 This 
underscores India’s increased interest in security 
cooperation with the EU. 
India is not only involved in blue 
helmet missions alongside African 
states, but also increasingly in the 
fight against pirates and terrorists. 
Anti-piracy operations are also important for India 
for another reason. The country has the sixth largest 
number of seafarers internationally. There is there-
fore a great danger that Indian citizens will become 
victims or hostages in pirate attacks. In 2011 the ar-
rest of pirates by Indian security forces led to threats 
to hijack Indian ships and take seamen hostage to 
exchange them for detained pirates.101 It is proving 
difficult for India to prosecute pirates since piracy is 
not listed as an offence in the Indian Penal Code.102 
India has also cooperated militarily with a number 
of African countries for many years. Since the 1960s, 
it has been training officers from predominantly 
English-speaking African states at Indian institutions. 
Between 1990/91 and 2000/01, some 800 officers from 
twelve African countries received training in India 
 
99 See Parmar, “Rise in Piracy: Case Study Somalia” 
(see note 54), 71. 
100 See “Indian Warship Escorts World Food Programme 
Vessel”, eunavfor.eu, 8 January 2019, https://eunavfor.eu/ 
indian-warship-escorts-world-food-programme-vessel/ 
(accessed 11 January 2019). 
101 See Parmar, “Rise in Piracy: Case Study Somalia” 
(see note 54), 71. 
102 See Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, “India’s Role in Counter 
Piracy Operations around Africa”, in India and Africa, ed. 
Gokarn, Sidhu and Godbole (see note 44), 23–25 (24). 
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under the ITEC programme.103 The Indian army has 
also sent trainers to African armed forces, including 
those of Botswana, Mauritius, the Seychelles and 
Zambia, and is helping these countries to improve 
their infrastructure. For example, the Indian army 
has participated in the establishment of defence acad-
emies in Ethiopia and Nigeria.104 
In 2003, the Indian Navy assumed security respon-
sibilities for the African Union Summit in the Mo-
zambican capital Maputo. In June 2004, two Indian 
warships were stationed off Maputo to secure the 
meetings of the World Economic Forum on Africa, 
and of heads of state from Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific.105 
India has traditionally maintained close relations 
with South Africa, including in the military sphere. 
The two countries signed an agreement on defence 
cooperation in 2000. India has since signed similar 
agreements with Tanzania (2003), the Seychelles 
(2003) and Nigeria (2007).106 The Indian government is 
also trying to expand its arms policy cooperation with 
African states. Some states have already purchased 
military equipment such as speedboats from India.107 
However, this remains a limited market, as India 
has so far had major problems building up an inter-
nationally competitive defence industry. Here, as in 
many other areas, the country is overshadowed by 
China, which has significantly expanded its arms 
exports to Africa. China had a ten per cent share of 
the arms sales in Africa from 1996 to 2003.108 
The Modi government has once again given greater 
priority to security cooperation with Africa. In view of 
the threat posed by groups such as so-called “Islamic 
State” and Boko Haram, India has opted for closer 
anti-terror cooperation with friendly African states.109 
Piracy, terrorist attacks and kidnappings have also 
repeatedly affected Indian citizens or the Indian dias-
 
103 See Beri, “India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War 
Era: An Assessment” (see note 4), 228. 
104 See Beri, “India-Africa Security Engagement” (see note 7), 
121. 
105 Ibid., 122. 
106 Ibid. 
107 See Wambua, “India-Africa Security Cooperation” 
(see note 3), 107. 
108 See Beri, “India-Africa Security Engagement” (see note 7), 
127. 
109 See “India Pitches for Counter-terror Cooperation with 
Africa”, The Hindu, 27 October 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/ 
news/national/india-pitches-for-counterterror-cooperation-
with-africa/article7810109.ece (accessed 27 October 2015). 
pora in Africa. During Modi’s visit to four southern 
and East African countries in 2016, security dialogue 
was emphasised and possibilities for information ex-
change between the secret services were discussed.110 
The Indian Ocean 
The Indian Ocean island states, particularly Mauritius 
and the Seychelles, occupy a special position in India’s 
security policy. As part of its Belt and Road Initiative, 
the government in Beijing has invested considerably 
more in infrastructure and port projects in countries 
bordering the Indian Ocean in recent years. Indian 
security experts fear that the ports will also be used 
militarily in the future and that India will be mili-
tarily encircled by them, as if by a string of pearls. 
In response, India has expanded its own security 
cooperation with these island states.111 On behalf of 
the government in Mauritius, India patrols and moni-
tors the island state’s Exclusive Economic Zone, and 
trains police and army members in fighting pirates. 
India has also transferred or sold ships to the island 
state, enabling Mauritius to improve its defence capa-
bilities in 2015/16. Finally, India is investing in the 
expansion of the port infrastructure on the island.112 
India is trying to counter China’s 
expansion in the Indian Ocean. 
India showed much greater military ambitions in 
the Seychelles. It has donated ships to the coastguard 
of the island state in 2006, 2014 and 2016, and a Dor-
nier-228 aircraft for airspace surveillance in 2013.113 
During his first visit in spring 2015, Prime Minister 
Modi emphasised security cooperation and presented 
 
110 See Kallol Bhattacherjee, “Delhi Steps Up Security 
Dialogue with Africa”, The Hindu, 5 July 2016, http://www. 
thehindu.com/news/national/delhi-steps-up-security-
dialogue-with-africa/article8807993.ece (accessed 5 July 
2016); Sreeram Chaulia, “A New Tryst with Africa”, The 
Hindu, 6 July 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/ 
modis-tour-to-africa/article8812261.ece (accessed 6 July 2016). 
111 Closer cooperation is also evident with the Maldives 
and Sri Lanka. The two states are not considered in the fol-
lowing, as they do not belong to Africa. 
112 See Gaurav Sharma, India – The Indian Ocean Region and 
Engagement with Four Littoral States: Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles 
and Mauritius, Working Paper Asia Division 2016/No. 01 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2016), 15f. 
113 Ibid., 13f. 
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the first radar system for coastal surveillance, in-
stalled by India.114 
India also planned to establish a military base 
in the Seychelles in response to increased Chinese 
activity in the Indian Ocean. In January 2018, the two 
states signed an agreement allowing India to build 
an airport and a landing stage for military use on 
Assumption Island. India would have significantly 
increased its military engagement in the Indian 
Ocean with such a base. However, the plan failed in 
summer 2018 after protests by the Seychelles Parlia-
ment against secret clauses in the treaty.115 
 
114 See Dinakar Peri, “In Seychelles, Modi Boosts Secu-
rity Cooperation”, The Hindu, 11 March 2015, http://www. 
thehindu.com/news/national/in-seychelles-modi-boosts-
security-cooperation/article6982284.ece (accessed 11 March 
2015). 
115 See Suhasini Haidar/Josy Joseph, “India’s Proposed 
Assumption Island Deal Drifts”, The Hindu, 16 June 2018, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-proposed-
assumption-island-deal-drifts/article24182507.ece (accessed 
16 June 2018). 
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There is no doubt that India has considerably ex-
panded its political, economic and military relations 
with Africa in recent years. Nevertheless, an assess-
ment of its Africa policy in the overall context of its 
foreign policy is difficult. 
Despite the increase in trading goods, the conti-
nent is unlikely to play a major role in Indian foreign 
policy in the foreseeable future, compared to South 
East Asia or the Middle East, for example. The big 
exception is the energy sector, since the increased 
energy imports especially from West African coun-
tries are essential to India’s efforts to diversify its 
imports. The African continent is probably even more 
important for India in the global context. India can 
repeatedly reinforce its claim to global leadership 
precisely in its relations with Africa. And due to their 
weight in the UN, African states are particularly im-
portant to the reform of international organisations 
that India wants.116 
Against this backdrop, the planned expansion of 
India’s diplomatic presence may seem contradictory, 
but it is in fact perfectly logical. At first glance, such a 
step is difficult to understand given the already scarce 
resources allocated to India’s foreign policy and the 
rather subordinate economic importance of the Afri-
can continent. However, in view of India’s global 
ambitions and its future Africa policy, this commit-
ment may make sense. India has so far been a rather 
weak actor in the context of international donors in 
Africa, compared to the industrialised countries or 
new donors such as China. Strengthening its local 
presence, which African states are also calling on 
India to do, is an indispensable prerequisite for re-
affirming its claim to leadership in the countries of 
the Global South, and for securing the economic in-
terests of Indian companies. Moreover, the expansion 
also takes account of Africa’s growing “regionalisa-
tion”. The varying economic and political develop-
ments in different parts of Africa will in future re-
quire a more specific Southern, West, East and Cen-
 
116 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 783. 
tral Africa policy, rather than a continent-wide strat-
egy. 
Measured against its own prerequisites, India’s 
Africa policy has a number of shortcomings that are 
currently being debated by experts. For example, dis-
senting voices point out that India’s extensive in-
volvement in blue helmet missions in Africa has so 
far not paid off at the international level.117 There are 
also criticisms that India, which exclusively provides 
troops, has hardly any influence on the peacekeepers’ 
mandate.118 Furthermore, China is now sending ever 
more personnel on such missions than before, and 
Western states have also intensified their security 
cooperation with Africa. As a result, this aspect is 
diminishing in importance for India,119 and the ques-
tion is raised as to in what other areas it can offer 
African states strategic added value.120 
From an African perspective, India remains an 
important partner, even if only to counter-balance 
excessive dependence on China.121 For African states, 
however, Chinese and Indian engagement are not a 
zero-sum game, but rather complementary initiatives. 
China has more numerous opportunities in Africa, 
as many examples demonstrate. Between 2000 and 
2014, it invested around US$350 billion in developing 
countries, making it one of the largest investors in 
Africa.122 India cannot compete with these orders of 
 
117 See W. P. S. Sidhu and Shruti Godbole, “A Case for 
Strenghtening India-Africa Partnership”, in India and Africa, 
ed. Gokarn, Sidhu and Godbole (see note 44), 10–13 (12). 
118 See Mukherjee, “At the Crossroads: India and the 
Future of UN Peacekeeping in Africa” (see note 96), 39. 
119 See Beri, “India-Africa Security Engagement” (see note 7), 
127. 
120 See Constantino Xavier, India’s Strategic Advantage over 
China in Africa, IDSA Comment (New Delhi: The Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses [IDSA], 30 June 2010). 
121 See Taylor, “India’s Rise in Africa” (see note 16), 796. 
122 See Karin Costa Vazquez and Kartikeya Dwivedi, “Race 
to the South: Is New Delhi Playing Catch-up with Beijing 
in Africa?”, The Wire, 3 September 2018, https://thewire.in/ 
diplomacy/india-china-africa-narendra-modi-xi-jinping-china-
africa-cooperation (accessed 3 September 2018). 
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magnitude. Although it is, inter alia, involved in a 
number of regional development banks in Africa, its 
shares are far lower than China’s. India holds 0.27 per 
cent of the shares in the African Development Bank, 
China 1.2 per cent. For the West African Develop-
ment Bank the figures are 0.07 per cent and 1.09 per 
cent respectively, and for Afreximbank 0.24 per cent 
and 5.48 per cent respectively.123 
Foreign policy makers in New Delhi are well aware 
of the discrepancies. They realise that they cannot en-
gage in a race for Africa with China. At a parliamen-
tary hearing on the Doklam crisis with China in 2017, 
former Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar 
explained that it would be “suicidal for the Govern-
ment of India to match port for port and airport for 
airport” with China.124 His successor, Vijay Gokhale, 
acknowledged that China’s promise of low-cost 
financing and rapid implementation of the projects 
was well received by many countries.125 
These insights, and China’s intentions to support 
African states in their industrialisation efforts,126 
probably explain why the Modi government is more 
likely to rely on soft power in its future relations with 
Africa. India is making laborious progress in its own 
industrialisation. Modi set out ten principles of 
India’s future Africa policy in his speech to the Ugan-
dan parliament on 25 July 2018. These mainly con-
cern historical relations, trade and cultural links.127 
 
123 See Rahul Mazumdar, “India Remains an Onlooker 
as Chinese Institutional Equity Floods Africa – Analysis”, 
eurasiareview.com, 15 August 2018, http://www.eurasiareview. 
com/15082018-india-remains-an-onlooker-as-chinese-institu 
tional-equity-floods-africa-analysis/?utm_source=Silk+Road+ 
headlines&utm_campaign=c8f25eaf2f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_ 
2018_08_16_09_25&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_7011 
9be3b7-c8f25eaf2f-79944201 (accessed 16 August 2018). 
124 See Devirupa Mitra, “In Official Testimony to MPs, Gov-
ernment Revealed Full Story of Doklam”, The Wire, 15 August 
2018, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/doklam-parliamentary-
standing-committee-india-china (accessed 16 August 2018). 
125 Ibid. 
126 See Deborah Bräutigam, “Xi Jinping Is Visiting Africa 
This Week. Here’s Why China Is Such a Popular Develop-
ment Partner”, The Washington Post, 24 July 2018; Yunnan 
Chen, Silk Road to the Sahel: African Ambitions in China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative, Policy Brief No. 23 (Washington, D.C.: China 
Africa Research Initiative, 2018). 
127 See Mullen, “Refocusing on Africa. Slow Delivery of 
Aid, Low Credit Disbursement Can Undo India’s Strategy” 
(see note 87). A list of the principles can be found in Re-
energising India’s Engagement with Africa. Highlights of Prime 
Minster Narendra Modi’s Visit to 3 Nations. Rwanda – Uganda – 
Opportunities and Prospects for Indo-
German Cooperation in Third Countries 
Germany and India share a number of strategic inter-
ests in Africa and the Indian Ocean.128 These include 
the economic development of Africa and the strength-
ening of state structures, as well as securing sea 
routes and combating piracy. Germany and India also 
want to prevent African states from becoming too 
politically and economically dependent on China, 
which could be the outcome of their growing indebt-
edness. 
To deepen cooperation, a first step would be tri-
angular (development) cooperation.129 This form of 
cooperation has gained in importance in recent years 
since emerging countries, a category that includes 
India, themselves provide development aid, albeit 
according to different criteria. 
Even though India likes to present its South-South 
cooperation as a counter-model to Western develop-
ment cooperation, for some years now it has been 
open to triangular cooperation with Western indus-
trialised countries. In 2016 India and the USA agreed 
on development cooperation in Asia and Africa. To 
date, the two countries have supported joint projects 
in several African countries, for example in the 
health sector and rural development, through educa-
tion and training programmes and technology trans-
fer.130 Together with Great Britain, India is also active 
in African third countries, for example in energy, 
health, and food security.131 The Asia-Africa Growth 
 
South Africa (n.p., n.d.), http://mea.gov.in/flipbook/Re-
energising-India-Engagement-With-Africa/ (accessed 
15 August 2018). 
128 See Garima Mohan, Engaging with the Indian Ocean. 
Opportunities and Challenges for Germany (Berlin: Global Public 
Policy Institute, November 2017). 
129 See Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ), Dreieckskooperationen in der deutschen ent-
wicklungspolitischen Zusammenarbeit, BMZ Strategy Paper 5/2013 
(Bonn and Berlin, 2013), https://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/ 
publikationen/archiv/reihen/strategiepapiere/Strategiepapier 
329_05_ 2013.pdf (accessed 28 January 2019). 
130 See the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), U.S.-India Triangular Cooperation, https://www. 
usaid.gov/india/us-india-triangular-cooperation (accessed 
28 January 2019). 
131 See Sebastian Paulo, India as a Partner in Triangular Devel-
opment Cooperation: Prospects for the India-UK Partnership for 
Global Development, Observer Research Foundation Working 
Paper (New Delhi: ORF, March 2018). 
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Corridor being planned with Japan is a further exam-
ple of triangular cooperation. 
A number of topics and sectors are also suitable for 
triangular cooperation between India and Germany. 
German DC supported the development of a health 
insurance scheme for poor population groups, the 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) programme, 
and accompanied its introduction. Other states, in-
cluding those in Africa, have signalled their interest 
in introducing or adopting such a programme. Some 
institutions in India can also draw on long experience 
in development cooperation with Africa. This applies, 
for example, to capacity building through education 
and training measures, such as in agriculture, irriga-
tion management, and technology transfer. Germany, 
for its part, has for many years been promoting pro-
grammes in India and Africa to expand alternative 
energies and improve energy efficiency. Opportuni-
ties for cooperation could open up within the frame-
work of the International Solar Alliance initiated by 
India, even though Germany is not yet a member of 
the organisation. Both countries have also invested in 
infrastructure development in Africa and supported 
regional organisations. This results in a broad spec-
trum of initiatives for triangular cooperation with 
India in Africa. 
Although triangular cooperation has a high sym-
bolic value for cooperation with a partner country, it 
also requires greater administrative effort. As more 
actors are involved, the time and coordination effort 
involved increases significantly for everyone. While 
German DC in the recipient states engages in tech-
nical and financial cooperation with its own imple-
mentation organisations, such as the German Society 
for International Cooperation (GIZ), Indian South-
South cooperation takes place primarily within India, 
for example in capacity building. Technical assistance 
in the form of German DC projects is, in India’s view, 
business development for Indian companies. More-
over, although India has repeatedly sent individual 
experts and advisors to other countries, it does not 
have an implementation organisation for its develop-
ment policy, such as the GIZ. The implementation of 
projects remains the responsibility of the government 
agencies entrusted with this task, such as embassies, 
or private companies. 
Despite these differences, closer development co-
operation should be pursued with India. In the con-
text of bilateral relations with India, this strategic 
partnership could be further expanded and taken to 
a new level. 
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Abbreviations 
AAGC Asia-Africa Growth Corridor 
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia 
ANC African National Congress 
AU African Union 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
CII Confederation of Indian Industry 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibilities 
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
DC Development Cooperation 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU European Union 
EXIM State-owned Indian Export-Import Bank 
GIZ German Society for International Cooperation 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
IBSA India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum 
ICCR Indian Council for Cultural Relations 
IDSA The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 
(New Delhi) 
INC Indian National Congress 
IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association 
ISA International Solar Alliance 
ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation 
LDC Least Developed Countries 
MEA Ministry of External Affairs 
NPT (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NRI Non Resident Indian 
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OCI Overseas Citizenship of India 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
ORF Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi) 
PIO Person of Indian Origin 
RSBY Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SCAAP Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa 
Programme 
TCS Technical Cooperation Scheme 
TEAM 9 Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India 
Movement 
UN United Nations 
USAID The United States Agency for International 
Development 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
